Security architecture (RFC 8826, RFC 8827)

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IDSpecRequirementModuleTestStatus
SEC-18827 §6.5All media encrypted with SRTP keyed from DTLS-SRTP; no unencrypted RTP offeredwebrtc_jsep_build (UDP/TLS/RTP/SAVPF only), webrtc_mediawebrtc_pc_SUITEInteroperability tested
SEC-28827 §6.5Data channels only over DTLSwebrtc_transportwebrtc_pc_SUITEInteroperability tested
SEC-38827 §6.5DTLS 1.2 or later, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, P-256webrtc_dtls_cryptodtls.md DTLS-13Interoperability tested
SEC-48827 §6.5Peer certificate verified against the SDP fingerprint, mismatch fatalwebrtc_dtls_hswebrtc_pc_SUITE:fingerprint_mismatch_fails, webrtc_dtls_interop_SUITEInteroperability tested
SEC-58827 §6.5Fresh self-signed certificate per peer connection by defaultwebrtc_pcImplemented, untested
SEC-68826 §4.2ICE consent before sending, consent freshnesswebrtc_ice_agentice.mdUnit tested
SEC-78826 §4.2Traffic from unvalidated addresses ignoredwebrtc_transportwebrtc_security_SUITE:spoofed_traffic_droppedE2E tested
SEC-83711 §3.3.2, 6347 §4.1.2.6Replay protection for SRTP, SRTCP and DTLSwebrtc_srtp, webrtc_dtlswebrtc_security_SUITE:replayed_datagrams_droppedE2E tested
SEC-9Every externally reachable parser total on arbitrary inputall codecsprop_webrtc_parsers, per-module truncation testsUnit tested
SEC-10Floods of invalid STUN or random datagrams do not grow state or break the sessionwebrtc_transport, webrtc_ice_agentwebrtc_security_SUITEE2E tested
SEC-118827 §5Identity assertions (IdP)Not implemented (browser identity provider API, out of scope for a library peer)
SEC-128827 §6.5SRTP MKI not usedwebrtc_srtpsrtp.mdUnit tested
SEC-138827 §4Keys and credentials stay out of logs: sys:get_status/1 of the peer connection and transport shows a summary. A crash in a callback is logged redacted (summary, a reason without values, a stack trace without arguments), and the process stops with a {shutdown, _} reason, for which OTP writes no crash report and so lists no queued messagewebrtc_redact, webrtc_pc, webrtc_transportwebrtc_security_SUITE:no_secrets_in_crash_logsE2E tested: DTLS private key, local and remote ICE passwords, TURN credential, including a call carrying a password queued while the process crashes
SEC-143550 §6.3, 8826 §4Per-peer state bounded by the streams we know: feedback (NACK, PLI, FIR) is counted on our streams only, an SR from a stream we do not receive creates nothing, PAUSE and XR entries are capped, TMMBR follows only the owners of its bounding set, a stream's statistics go with it on BYE or expiry, and the stream table refuses entries past twice the stream limitwebrtc_media_in, webrtc_media_out, webrtc_media_pause, webrtc_tmmbrwebrtc_media_bounds_testsUnit tested: 10,000 PLI for unknown SSRCs and 5,000 random RTCP packets from random SSRCs leave the maps within their bounds
SEC-15Nothing outlives its peer connection: the webrtc_transports rows are removed by webrtc_registry, which monitors every peer connection (after kill too) and drops rows naming a dead transport on lookup; the signaling helper monitors its peer connection, is killed on terminate, and holds at most 64 waiting messages; the workers opening TCP and TLS connections are linked to their transport and killed when it stopswebrtc_registry, webrtc_pc, webrtc_peer_sup, webrtc_transport_netwebrtc_lifecycle_SUITEE2E tested: close, owner exit, kill of the peer connection or a transport, application stop and start, a stuck codec plugin, 200 abandoned and 200 short-lived connections all come back to the node's process, port and table counts; make soak repeats it for an hour