DTLS (RFC 9147, RFC 8446, RFC 6347, RFC 5764, RFC 7627, RFC 8842, RFC 8122, RFC 8827 §6.5)

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Both versions are offered by default (versions => ['dtlsv1.3', 'dtlsv1.2']); the server picks DTLS 1.3 when the client offers it. DTLS 1.2 rows are tested by the dtls12_* cases of webrtc_dtls_tests and the DTLS 1.2 interop cases; the other cases of webrtc_dtls_tests negotiate DTLS 1.3.

DTLS 1.2 and shared requirements

IDSpecRequirementModuleTestStatus
DTLS-16347 §4.1Record framing, several records per datagramwebrtc_dtls_record, webrtc_dtls12webrtc_dtls_tests, interop suiteInteroperability tested
DTLS-26347 §4.1.2.6Anti-replay window (256) per epoch, updated only after authentication; a jump beyond the window resets itwebrtc_dtls_record, webrtc_dtls12record_replay_window_test, record_replay_window_jump_test, app_data_testUnit tested
DTLS-36347 §4.1.2.7Invalid records silently discardedwebrtc_dtls12app_data_test (tampered), garbage_never_crashes_testUnit tested
DTLS-46347 §4.2.1Cookie exchange (HelloVerifyRequest, whose server_version is DTLS 1.0 whatever version follows), first ClientHello and HVR excluded from transcriptwebrtc_dtls_hsdtls12_handshake_test, fallback_to_12_server_test, hello_verify_request_version_test, interop (OpenSSL server uses cookies), BoGoInteroperability tested
DTLS-56347 §4.2.2message_seq handling, server takes it from ClientHellowebrtc_dtls_reasm, webrtc_dtls_hsinterop suiteInteroperability tested
DTLS-66347 §4.2.3Handshake fragmentation and reassembly, overlapping fragments, fragments of any size (down to one byte)webrtc_dtls_msg, webrtc_dtls_reasmdtls12_small_mtu_fragmentation_test, one_byte_fragments_test, BoGo (SplitHandshakeRecords, PackHandshake)Interoperability tested
DTLS-76347 §4.2.4, §4.2.1Flight retransmission with exponential back-off, resend on peer retransmission (a replayed record is not one, nor a copy within half the initial timer of our flight, which belongs to the burst we answered, nor a copy of a HelloVerifyRequest); the client that received the server's final flight never resends its ownwebrtc_dtls12, webrtc_dtls_reasmdtls12single_loss_test, dtls12_heavy_loss_test, timeout_test, replayed_flight_after_ccs_test, final_flight_copy_ignored_test, copies_in_burst_test, BoGo (DTLS-Replay, ReorderHandshakeFragments, MixCompleteMessageWithFragments)Interoperability tested
DTLS-86347 §4.2.6Transcript includes DTLS handshake headerswebrtc_dtls_hsinterop suite (Finished verified by OTP ssl and OpenSSL)Interoperability tested
DTLS-95246 §7.4.1.4No unsolicited extensions in ServerHello (refused with unsupported_extension); at most one extension per typewebrtc_dtls_hs, webrtc_dtls_msgBoGo (UnsolicitedServerNameAck)Interoperability tested
DTLS-105246 §7.2close_notify sent and answeredwebrtc_dtls12dtls12_close_notify_testUnit tested
DTLS-115746renegotiation_info sent; renegotiation refusedwebrtc_dtls_hsinterop suiteInteroperability tested
DTLS-127627Extended master secret offered, required by defaultwebrtc_dtls_hsdtls12_handshake_test, otp_server_without_ems_rejectedInteroperability tested
DTLS-138827 §6.5TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 with P-256webrtc_dtls_cryptosuitestest, dtls12suites_test, interopInteroperability tested
DTLS-149325 §4.2Only AEAD suites with forward secrecy offeredwebrtc_dtls_cryptodtls12suites_testUnit tested
DTLS-157905ChaCha20-Poly1305 suiteswebrtc_dtls_recorddtls12suites_testUnit tested
DTLS-168422x25519, P-256, P-384; invalid and all-zero shared secrets rejectedwebrtc_dtls_cryptodtls12groups_test, groupstestUnit tested
DTLS-178827 §6.5Mutual authentication: CertificateRequest always sent, empty client certificate rejectedwebrtc_dtls_hsinterop (OTP client)Interoperability tested
DTLS-188122 §5Peer certificate must match an SDP fingerprint; SHA-1/224 not acceptedwebrtc_dtls_cert, webrtc_dtls_hsdtls12_fingerprint_mismatch_test, sha1_fingerprint_not_accepted_test, otp_server_rejected_fingerprintInteroperability tested
DTLS-198842 §5DTLS role given by the caller from a=setup, independent of ICE rolewebrtc_dtlspc_dtls_version, pc_dtls_version_peer_offer (both roles with each peer)Interoperability tested
DTLS-205764 §4.1.1use_srtp: client offers list, server selects exactly one offered profilewebrtc_dtls_hsdtls12_srtp_profile_selection_test, interopInteroperability tested
DTLS-215764 §4.1.1Client rejects a ServerHello with a profile it did not offerwebrtc_dtls_hsImplemented, untested
DTLS-225764 §4.2, 5705Keying material exporter, label EXTRACTOR-dtls_srtpwebrtc_dtls, webrtc_dtls_cryptointerop compares key material with OTP ssl and OpenSSLInteroperability tested
DTLS-235246 §5TLS 1.2 PRFwebrtc_dtls_cryptoprf_sha256_vector_testUnit tested
DTLS-24Malformed input never crashes the engine (both versions)webrtc_dtls12, webrtc_dtls13garbagenever_crashes_test, dtls12_mutated_handshake_test, garbage_test, mutated_handshake_testUnit tested
DTLS-258842Connection reported only after fingerprint verification; data held until then (both versions)webrtc_dtls_hsdtls12_deferred_fingerprint_test, deferred_fingerprint_client_test, deferred_fingerprint_server_test, deferred_fingerprint_mismatch_testUnit tested
DTLS-269147DTLS 1.3, negotiated with fallback to DTLS 1.2 (details in DTLS-30 to DTLS-59)webrtc_dtls13*webrtc_dtls13_tests, interop with OpenSSL 4.1 (both roles) and Chromium (both roles)Interoperability tested
DTLS-276347 §4.2.8Session resumption in DTLS 1.2 (session IDs or tickets); DTLS 1.3 resumes with PSK tickets instead (DTLS-56, DTLS-59)webrtc_dtls_hsNot implemented in DTLS 1.2: the server sends an empty session ID, so every 1.2 handshake is a full one
DTLS-289146Connection ID for DTLS 1.2: the connection_id extension in the hellos (also when DTLS 1.3 is offered and the server picks 1.2), tls12_cid records from epoch 1 with the peer's CID, the RFC 9146 §5 additional data and inner plaintext (padding accepted), a zero-length CID for send-only, records with an unknown CID dropped, fragments sized for the CIDwebrtc_dtls_record, webrtc_dtls12, webrtc_dtls_hswebrtc_dtls12_cid_tests, prop_webrtc_parsers (dtls12_cid_record, dtls12_cid_open), webrtc_dtls_interop_SUITE mbedtls and piondtls groupsInteroperability tested (mbedTLS 3.6 and pion/dtls 3.1, both roles); no rotation: DTLS 1.2 has no NewConnectionId
DTLS-296347 §4.2.2HelloVerifyRequest record sequence equals the ClientHello'swebrtc_dtls_hsNon-compliant / known limitation: our server keeps per-association state, so it uses its own epoch 0 counter. No interop impact observed. RFC 9147 has no such rule for the HelloRetryRequest.

DTLS 1.3

IDSpecRequirementModuleTestStatus
DTLS-308446 §4.2.1, 9147 §5.3Version negotiation with supported_versions: 1.3 and 1.2 offered, the server picks 1.3 when offered, versions restricts; an endpoint without TLS 1.3 suites does not support 1.3webrtc_dtls_hsfallbackto_12_server_test, fallback_to_12_client_test, no_common_version_test, server_without_13_suites_test, openssl_any_client_our_server, openssl_any_server_our_12_client, otp_server_our_clientInteroperability tested
DTLS-318446 §4.1.3, 9147 §5.3Downgrade sentinel set by a 1.3 capable server that negotiates 1.2, checked by a client that offered 1.3webrtc_dtls_hsdowngrade_detection_test, downgrade_sentinel_ignored_by_12_client_test, openssl_downgrade_detected (OpenSSL's sentinel), openssl_any_client_our_12_server (OpenSSL checks ours)Interoperability tested
DTLS-329147 §4, §4.1DTLSPlaintext only in epoch 0 and only for ClientHello, ServerHello and HelloRetryRequest; unified header with 16-bit sequence number and length; demultiplexing by first byte; records with a connection ID droppedwebrtc_dtls13_record, webrtc_dtls13splittest, record_roundtrip_test, plaintext_alert_ignored_test, interopInteroperability tested
DTLS-339147 §4.2.3Record number encryption (AES-ECB and ChaCha20 masks), ciphertexts under 16 bytes rejectedwebrtc_dtls13_recordrecordroundtrip_test, replay_test, openssl13_aes256_our_client, openssl13_chacha20_our_client, openssl13_chacha20_our_serverInteroperability tested
DTLS-349147 §4.2.2Record number and epoch reconstructionwebrtc_dtls13_recordreconstructtest, select_epoch_test, sequence_wrap_test, many_key_updates_testUnit tested
DTLS-359147 §4.5.1Replay window per epoch, updated after deprotectionwebrtc_dtls13replay_test, reordering_testUnit tested
DTLS-368446 §5.3, 9147 §4AEAD nonce from the 64-bit sequence number (epoch excluded, erratum 8141); AAD is the header before record number encryption; inner plaintext content typewebrtc_dtls13_recordrecordroundtrip_test, interopInteroperability tested
DTLS-379147 §4.5.3, 8446 §5.5AEAD limits: forgeries counted per key (2^36 closes), KeyUpdate after rekey_records (default 2^23), no sending past 2^24.5 records with AES-GCMwebrtc_dtls13automatic_key_update_testPartially tested: the limits themselves are out of reach of a test run
DTLS-388446 §7.1, 9147 §5.9Key schedule with the "dtls13" label prefixwebrtc_dtls13_keysrfc8448_key_schedule_test, dtls13_label_prefix_test, hkdf_rfc5869_test, interopInteroperability tested
DTLS-398446 §9.1TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256; server preferencewebrtc_dtls13_keys, webrtc_dtls13_serversuitestest, serversuite_preference_test, openssl13*Interoperability tested
DTLS-408446 §4.2.8ECDHE key share (x25519, P-256, P-384), one share offered for the preferred groupwebrtc_dtls13_hs, webrtc_dtls13_servergroupstest, hrr_key_share_test, no_common_group_testInteroperability tested (x25519)
DTLS-419147 §5.1, 8446 §4.1.4, §4.4.1HelloRetryRequest with a stateless cookie (HMAC-SHA256, age limit cookie_lifetime), transcript with message_hash; invalid cookie refused with illegal_parameter; second HelloRetryRequest refused; key share retry for another groupwebrtc_dtls13_server, webrtc_dtls13_hshrr_cookie_test, hrr_key_share_test, hrr_stateless_test, cookie_test, openssl13_client_our_server (X25519MLKEM768 share retried as x25519), openssl13_server_our_client (OpenSSL's HelloRetryRequest)Interoperability tested
DTLS-429147 §5.3, erratum 8066legacy_cookie empty in a 1.3 ClientHello; legacy_session_id_echo emptywebrtc_dtls13_server, webrtc_dtls13_hslegacy_cookie_test, session_id_echo_testUnit tested
DTLS-435764 §4.1.1, 8446 §4.3.1use_srtp in EncryptedExtensions: one offered profile; unsolicited extensions refusedwebrtc_dtls13_hs, webrtc_dtls13_serversrtp_profile_selection_test, no_common_srtp_profile_test, no_srtp_test, interopInteroperability tested
DTLS-448827 §6.5, 8446 §4.3.2, §4.4.2Mutual authentication: CertificateRequest always sent, empty client Certificate refused with certificate_requiredwebrtc_dtls13_serveropenssl13_client_without_certificate, interopInteroperability tested
DTLS-458446 §4.4.3, §4.2.3CertificateVerify over the transcript: scheme we offered, no RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, ECDSA curve matching the certificatewebrtc_dtls13_hsrsa_certificate_test, mixed_certificate_test, openssl13_rsa_certificatesInteroperability tested
DTLS-468446 §4.4.4Finished verified in constant timewebrtc_dtls13_hsevery handshakeInteroperability tested
DTLS-479147 §5.2Transcript over TLS 1.3 style messages, without message_seq and fragment fieldswebrtc_dtls13_hsinterop (Finished verified by OpenSSL and Chromium)Interoperability tested
DTLS-489147 §5.5Fragmentation and reassembly, overlapping fragments, one epoch per messagewebrtc_dtls13, webrtc_dtls_reasmsmallmtu_test, small_mtu_loss_test, interop (OpenSSL fragments its 1.4 KB ClientHello)Interoperability tested
DTLS-499147 §7, §5.8ACK: final flight acknowledged in epoch 3, partial flights after a quarter of the timer (armed once per new record), retransmission of the unacknowledged part only, implicit acknowledgement by the next handshake flight but never of the client's final flight (a NewSessionTicket or KeyUpdate is not one), post-handshake messages and copies acknowledged on the same timer, each ACK repeating the latest record numbers that fit in one ACK record; a copy of a HelloRetryRequest or of the peer's flight in the same burst does not make us resendwebrtc_dtls13ack_final_flight_test, lost_ack_test, partial_flight_ack_test, no_ack_no_connection_test, copies_in_burst_test, hrr_copy_test, post_handshake_ack_timer_test, ack_set_bounded_test, BoGo (DTLS-Retransmit-*, ReorderHandshakeFragments, PackHandshake), interop (OpenSSL ACKs and NewSessionTicket)Interoperability tested
DTLS-509147 §7ACK epochs: during the handshake an ACK is sent in an epoch at least that of the records it covers, and one covering a later epoch is refused; after it ACKs go in our highest sending epoch whatever the records' epochs, so a peer's KeyUpdates are acknowledged without waiting for one of ours (Figure 14; erratum 8108, only reported, is not applied after the handshake); unknown record numbers ignoredwebrtc_dtls13ack_for_later_epoch_after_handshake_test, ack_unknown_records_test, ack_in_older_epoch_testUnit tested
DTLS-519147 §5.8.2Timers: 400 ms initial (the DTLS-SRTP recommendation), doubled up to 60 s, rtx_limitwebrtc_dtls13timeouttest, heavy_loss_testUnit tested
DTLS-529147 §5.8.1, 8446 §4.4.4Application data of epoch 3 or later processed only after the peer Finished; the client is connected once its Finished flight is out (data flows both ways), keeps resending it until the server's ACK and fails without onewebrtc_dtls13, webrtc_dtls13_hsserver_rejects_client_fingerprint_test, deferred_fingerprint_client_test, no_ack_no_connection_test, data_while_waiting_for_ack_test, BoGo (DTLS-Retransmit-Client-NoImplictACKFinished)Interoperability tested
DTLS-539147 §4.2.1, §6.1Records of epoch 2 or 3 arriving before their keys are buffered (32) and processed once the keys exist; other epochs without keys are discardedwebrtc_dtls13records_before_server_hello_test, duplication_and_reordering_testUnit tested
DTLS-549147 §8, §4.2.1, errata 8047, 8050KeyUpdate: on request or after rekey_records, new keys only after the ACK, update_requested acknowledged at once and answered (Figure 14), once while ours is pending, a retransmitted KeyUpdate acknowledged again, previous read epoch kept for reordering for one MSL (2 minutes) after the first record of the new one, epochs limited to 2^16-1webrtc_dtls13_epochkey_update_test, many_key_updates_test, key_update_lost_ack_test, automatic_key_update_test, key_update_errors_test, key_update_request_answered_once_test, previous_epoch_expires_test, openssl13_server_key_update, openssl13_client_key_update, BoGo (KeyUpdate-*-DTLS)Interoperability tested
DTLS-558446 §7.5, 5764 §4.2Exporter, EXTRACTOR-dtls_srtp; no context and empty context are the samewebrtc_dtls13_keyshandshake_test, interop compares key material with OpenSSL; SRTP media with Chromium (webrtc_pc_interop_SUITE)Interoperability tested
DTLS-568446 §4.6.1, §4.2.9NewSessionTicket: with resumption => true the server issues a stateless ticket after each handshake (AES-256-GCM under a key that lives with the ticket table, holding the PSK, suite, issue time, age_add, the peer certificate and the early data limit), only to a client that offered psk_dhe_ke; the client keeps the last ticket per set of remote fingerprints, for single usewebrtc_dtls13_hs, webrtc_dtls13_server, webrtc_dtls_ticketsresumption_test, tickets_need_psk_modes_test, openssl13_server_resumption, openssl13_client_resumptionInteroperability tested
DTLS-579147 §5.1Amplification limit: until a cookie exchange or the end of the handshake validates the client's address, a server sends at most three times the bytes received from it; datagrams over the limit wait for more bytes or the validation (DTLS 1.2 without HelloVerifyRequest too); address_validated => true for an owner that validated the address otherwisewebrtc_dtls, webrtc_dtls13_server, webrtc_dtls_hswebrtc_dtls13_tests:amplification_limit_test, amplification_limit_dtls12_test, cookie_validates_address_testUnit tested; WebRTC transports keep the cookie exchange on
DTLS-589147 §5.8.3, §5.8.2, §4.4At most 10 records per transmission, the rest after the next ACK or timer; the timer of a new flight is 1.5 times the RTT of the last flight acknowledged without retransmission (at least 50 ms), after the handshake a backed-off value is kept until then (handshake flights start from the RTT based value: under 30% loss a carried back-off held handshakes past their deadline); from the second retransmission records and datagrams shrink to half the MTU (at least 512 bytes)webrtc_dtls13webrtc_dtls13_tests:max_records_test, rtt_timer_test, smaller_records_testUnit tested; the 400 ms initial value is kept (the DTLS-SRTP practice, RFC 9147 suggests 1 s)
DTLS-598446 §2.2, §2.3, §4.2.9 to §4.2.11, §8PSK resumption with psk_dhe_ke only (forward secrecy kept), binder checked, ticket age and lifetime checked, the ticket's certificate checked against the current SDP fingerprints (RFC 8827 §6.5 holds without certificate messages); 0-RTT with early_data => true: early data in epoch 1 within the ticket limit, accepted once per ticket (anti-replay), rejected after a HelloRetryRequest (early_data_rejected, the caller resends)webrtc_dtls13_hs, webrtc_dtls13_server, webrtc_dtls13_keysrfc8448_resumption_test, resumption_refused_test, early_data_test, early_data_rejected_on_retry_test, openssl13_server_early_data, openssl13_client_early_data, webrtc_pc_SUITE:dtls_resumptionInteroperability tested; off by default, browsers do not resume DTLS
DTLS-778446 §8The ticket key and the anti-replay set share one lifetime: after an application restart no earlier ticket opens, so no early data is replayed; the table holds at most 10,000 entries, a full table refuses early data rather than forget a used ticket, a new client ticket replaces the oldestwebrtc_dtls_ticketswebrtc_dtls_tickets_tests, early_data_replay_after_restart_testUnit tested
DTLS-648446 §4.6.2, §4.2.6, 9147 §5.8.4Post-handshake authentication: a client with post_handshake_auth => true offers the extension; the server asks with request_client_auth/2 (a fresh context, one request at a time); the client answers with Certificate, CertificateVerify and Finished over the handshake transcript and the CertificateRequest, keyed by its current traffic secret; the certificate must match the remote fingerprints; {peer_authenticated, Der} on success; a request the client did not allow is unexpected_messagewebrtc_dtls13_phawebrtc_dtls13_tests:pha_test, pha_not_offered_test, pha_wrong_certificate_test, pha_lost_answer_test, openssl13_client_pha, openssl13_server_phaInteroperability tested (OpenSSL 4.1 both roles); off by default, WebRTC authenticates in the handshake
DTLS-629147 §9, 9146 §3Connection ID: connection_id extension in ClientHello and ServerHello when both sides enable it (dtls => #{connection_id => true}), the peer's CID in our protected records (C bit, part of the additional data), records with a CID we did not offer rejectedwebrtc_dtls13_record, webrtc_dtls13_hs, webrtc_dtls13_serverwebrtc_dtls13_tests:connection_id_test, connection_id_refused_test, unexpected_cid_record_test, webrtc_pc_SUITE:dtls_connection_idE2E tested; no interop peer negotiates it (OpenSSL's tools have no option for it, browsers do not offer it); off by default
DTLS-639147 §9, §5.8.4, 9146 §8After the handshake: we receive on up to 4 CIDs of the offered length, records with another CID dropped; a RequestConnectionId is answered with spare CIDs (NewConnectionId, usage spare) as many as asked for and fit; once the peer's authenticated records carry another of our CIDs the previous one is retired, still accepted for late records until a request needs its room, so rotation goes on indefinitely; the peer's spare CIDs kept (up to 8); NewConnectionId for immediate use switches the CID we send; on an ICE restart or a new selected pair our records move to a spare CID, asking for more when none is left; one CID message at a time, after the current flight is acknowledged; both refused with unexpected_message when CIDs were not negotiatedwebrtc_dtls13_cid, webrtc_dtls13_hs, webrtc_transport_securewebrtc_dtls13_tests:new_connection_id_test, request_connection_id_test, rotate_without_spares_test, unknown_cid_dropped_test, cid_message_waits_for_ack_test, many_rotations_test, retired_cid_still_accepted_test, lost_cid_messages_test, webrtc_pc_SUITE:connection_id_rotation (five ICE restarts)E2E tested; no independent implementation to test against: OpenSSL 4.1 has no DTLS 1.3 CID API, mbedTLS 3 and Pion only DTLS 1.2 CIDs (RFC 9146, without these messages)
DTLS-606347 §4.2.3, 9147 §5.5Reassembly bounded under hostile fragmentation: held bytes never exceed the advertised length, at most 256 disjoint ranges per message (fragments that extend a range do not count), a range's data copied into one binary past 32 fragmentswebrtc_dtls_reasmoverlap_flood_test, tiny_fragments_capped_test, one_byte_fragments_test, held_bytes_bounded_testUnit tested
DTLS-618842 §5, 9429 §5.8.3Changed remote fingerprints or tls-id: refused without an ICE restart; with one, the old association is closed (SRTP keys and SCTP dropped) and a new handshake starts with the new fingerprints; our descriptions carry a=tls-id, renewed with each associationwebrtc_jsep, webrtc_transportwebrtcjsep_tests:fingerprint_change*, tls_id_offered_test, webrtc_pc_SUITE:fingerprint_change_refused, fingerprint_change_ends_associationE2E tested
DTLS-655246 §7.2.2, 8446 §6.2A handshake message the state does not expect is refused with unexpected_message before its body is parsed; only an expected one that does not parse is a decode_errorwebrtc_dtls_hsBoGo (WrongMessageType)Interoperability tested
DTLS-665246 §6.2.1, 8446 §5.2, §6An authentic record of more than 2^14 bytes of plaintext ends the connection with record_overflow; an alert of unknown level with illegal_parameterwebrtc_dtls_record, webrtc_dtls13_record, webrtc_dtls12, webrtc_dtls13recordlimits_test, BoGo (LargePlaintext, SendBogusAlertType)Interoperability tested
DTLS-675246 §7.4.9, 8446 §4.4.4A Finished that is not the expected verify_data, whatever its length, ends the connection with decrypt_errorwebrtc_dtls_hs, webrtc_dtls13_hsBoGo (TrailingMessageData-ServerFinished)Interoperability tested
DTLS-689147 §4The client's ClientHello records carry DTLS 1.0 until a version is chosen (allowed for the initial ClientHello, as DTLS 1.2 clients do), DTLS 1.2 after a HelloRetryRequestwebrtc_dtls12BoGo (VersionNegotiation)Interoperability tested
DTLS-699147 §5.1A DTLS 1.3 ServerHello after a HelloVerifyRequest is refusedwebrtc_dtls_hsBoGo (DTLS13-HelloVerifyRequest)Interoperability tested
DTLS-709147 §5.5Flights are packed: fragments of consecutive messages of one epoch share a record, and a record takes what is left of the datagram before a new one startswebrtc_dtls13BoGo (PackHandshake, SplitHandshakeRecords)Interoperability tested
DTLS-719147 §6.1Alerts: a DTLS 1.3 server that sent its Finished alerts in epoch 3; otherwise the epoch the peer last saw from uswebrtc_dtlsBoGo (TrailingMessageData-TLS13-ClientCertificate, DTLS13-SendExtraFinished-Packed)Interoperability tested
DTLS-728446 §4.2.4certificate_authorities is a non-empty list of non-empty nameswebrtc_dtls13_msgcertificate_authorities_syntax_test, BoGo (RejectEmptyCertificateAuthorities)Interoperability tested
DTLS-735246 §7.4.1.2A DTLS 1.2 client offers every suite whatever its own key type (the suite names the server's key)webrtc_dtlsmixedkey_types_testUnit tested
DTLS-745246 §7.4.8A DTLS 1.2 server reads the next epoch only after the client's CertificateVerify is verified; a ChangeCipherSpec that overtakes it is held until thenwebrtc_dtls12webrtc_dtls12_ccs_tests, DTLS-Fuzzer (interop/dtlsfuzzer)Unit tested
DTLS-758446 §5.1Handshake messages do not span a key change: data buffered after the server's Finished or a KeyUpdate in the same epoch, or a new message in an epoch already left, ends the connection with unexpected_message (sent before our keys change)webrtc_dtls13_hs, webrtc_dtls13_epoch, webrtc_dtls13extrafinished_test, message_after_key_update_test, BoGo (DTLS13-SendExtraFinished, KeyUpdate-ExtraMessage)Interoperability tested
DTLS-766347 §4.2.3, 9147 §5.5Messages buffered at most six ahead of the next expected one (the longest flight); further ones are droppedwebrtc_dtls_reasmwindow_test, BoGo (DTLS-FragmentWindow)Interoperability tested