| DTLS-30 | 8446 §4.2.1, 9147 §5.3 | Version negotiation with supported_versions: 1.3 and 1.2 offered, the server picks 1.3 when offered, versions restricts; an endpoint without TLS 1.3 suites does not support 1.3 | webrtc_dtls_hs | fallbackto_12_server_test, fallback_to_12_client_test, no_common_version_test, server_without_13_suites_test, openssl_any_client_our_server, openssl_any_server_our_12_client, otp_server_our_client | Interoperability tested |
| DTLS-31 | 8446 §4.1.3, 9147 §5.3 | Downgrade sentinel set by a 1.3 capable server that negotiates 1.2, checked by a client that offered 1.3 | webrtc_dtls_hs | downgrade_detection_test, downgrade_sentinel_ignored_by_12_client_test, openssl_downgrade_detected (OpenSSL's sentinel), openssl_any_client_our_12_server (OpenSSL checks ours) | Interoperability tested |
| DTLS-32 | 9147 §4, §4.1 | DTLSPlaintext only in epoch 0 and only for ClientHello, ServerHello and HelloRetryRequest; unified header with 16-bit sequence number and length; demultiplexing by first byte; records with a connection ID dropped | webrtc_dtls13_record, webrtc_dtls13 | splittest, record_roundtrip_test, plaintext_alert_ignored_test, interop | Interoperability tested |
| DTLS-33 | 9147 §4.2.3 | Record number encryption (AES-ECB and ChaCha20 masks), ciphertexts under 16 bytes rejected | webrtc_dtls13_record | recordroundtrip_test, replay_test, openssl13_aes256_our_client, openssl13_chacha20_our_client, openssl13_chacha20_our_server | Interoperability tested |
| DTLS-34 | 9147 §4.2.2 | Record number and epoch reconstruction | webrtc_dtls13_record | reconstructtest, select_epoch_test, sequence_wrap_test, many_key_updates_test | Unit tested |
| DTLS-35 | 9147 §4.5.1 | Replay window per epoch, updated after deprotection | webrtc_dtls13 | replay_test, reordering_test | Unit tested |
| DTLS-36 | 8446 §5.3, 9147 §4 | AEAD nonce from the 64-bit sequence number (epoch excluded, erratum 8141); AAD is the header before record number encryption; inner plaintext content type | webrtc_dtls13_record | recordroundtrip_test, interop | Interoperability tested |
| DTLS-37 | 9147 §4.5.3, 8446 §5.5 | AEAD limits: forgeries counted per key (2^36 closes), KeyUpdate after rekey_records (default 2^23), no sending past 2^24.5 records with AES-GCM | webrtc_dtls13 | automatic_key_update_test | Partially tested: the limits themselves are out of reach of a test run |
| DTLS-38 | 8446 §7.1, 9147 §5.9 | Key schedule with the "dtls13" label prefix | webrtc_dtls13_keys | rfc8448_key_schedule_test, dtls13_label_prefix_test, hkdf_rfc5869_test, interop | Interoperability tested |
| DTLS-39 | 8446 §9.1 | TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256; server preference | webrtc_dtls13_keys, webrtc_dtls13_server | suitestest, serversuite_preference_test, openssl13* | Interoperability tested |
| DTLS-40 | 8446 §4.2.8 | ECDHE key share (x25519, P-256, P-384), one share offered for the preferred group | webrtc_dtls13_hs, webrtc_dtls13_server | groupstest, hrr_key_share_test, no_common_group_test | Interoperability tested (x25519) |
| DTLS-41 | 9147 §5.1, 8446 §4.1.4, §4.4.1 | HelloRetryRequest with a stateless cookie (HMAC-SHA256, age limit cookie_lifetime), transcript with message_hash; invalid cookie refused with illegal_parameter; second HelloRetryRequest refused; key share retry for another group | webrtc_dtls13_server, webrtc_dtls13_hs | hrr_cookie_test, hrr_key_share_test, hrr_stateless_test, cookie_test, openssl13_client_our_server (X25519MLKEM768 share retried as x25519), openssl13_server_our_client (OpenSSL's HelloRetryRequest) | Interoperability tested |
| DTLS-42 | 9147 §5.3, erratum 8066 | legacy_cookie empty in a 1.3 ClientHello; legacy_session_id_echo empty | webrtc_dtls13_server, webrtc_dtls13_hs | legacy_cookie_test, session_id_echo_test | Unit tested |
| DTLS-43 | 5764 §4.1.1, 8446 §4.3.1 | use_srtp in EncryptedExtensions: one offered profile; unsolicited extensions refused | webrtc_dtls13_hs, webrtc_dtls13_server | srtp_profile_selection_test, no_common_srtp_profile_test, no_srtp_test, interop | Interoperability tested |
| DTLS-44 | 8827 §6.5, 8446 §4.3.2, §4.4.2 | Mutual authentication: CertificateRequest always sent, empty client Certificate refused with certificate_required | webrtc_dtls13_server | openssl13_client_without_certificate, interop | Interoperability tested |
| DTLS-45 | 8446 §4.4.3, §4.2.3 | CertificateVerify over the transcript: scheme we offered, no RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, ECDSA curve matching the certificate | webrtc_dtls13_hs | rsa_certificate_test, mixed_certificate_test, openssl13_rsa_certificates | Interoperability tested |
| DTLS-46 | 8446 §4.4.4 | Finished verified in constant time | webrtc_dtls13_hs | every handshake | Interoperability tested |
| DTLS-47 | 9147 §5.2 | Transcript over TLS 1.3 style messages, without message_seq and fragment fields | webrtc_dtls13_hs | interop (Finished verified by OpenSSL and Chromium) | Interoperability tested |
| DTLS-48 | 9147 §5.5 | Fragmentation and reassembly, overlapping fragments, one epoch per message | webrtc_dtls13, webrtc_dtls_reasm | smallmtu_test, small_mtu_loss_test, interop (OpenSSL fragments its 1.4 KB ClientHello) | Interoperability tested |
| DTLS-49 | 9147 §7, §5.8 | ACK: final flight acknowledged in epoch 3, partial flights after a quarter of the timer (armed once per new record), retransmission of the unacknowledged part only, implicit acknowledgement by the next handshake flight but never of the client's final flight (a NewSessionTicket or KeyUpdate is not one), post-handshake messages and copies acknowledged on the same timer, each ACK repeating the latest record numbers that fit in one ACK record; a copy of a HelloRetryRequest or of the peer's flight in the same burst does not make us resend | webrtc_dtls13 | ack_final_flight_test, lost_ack_test, partial_flight_ack_test, no_ack_no_connection_test, copies_in_burst_test, hrr_copy_test, post_handshake_ack_timer_test, ack_set_bounded_test, BoGo (DTLS-Retransmit-*, ReorderHandshakeFragments, PackHandshake), interop (OpenSSL ACKs and NewSessionTicket) | Interoperability tested |
| DTLS-50 | 9147 §7 | ACK epochs: during the handshake an ACK is sent in an epoch at least that of the records it covers, and one covering a later epoch is refused; after it ACKs go in our highest sending epoch whatever the records' epochs, so a peer's KeyUpdates are acknowledged without waiting for one of ours (Figure 14; erratum 8108, only reported, is not applied after the handshake); unknown record numbers ignored | webrtc_dtls13 | ack_for_later_epoch_after_handshake_test, ack_unknown_records_test, ack_in_older_epoch_test | Unit tested |
| DTLS-51 | 9147 §5.8.2 | Timers: 400 ms initial (the DTLS-SRTP recommendation), doubled up to 60 s, rtx_limit | webrtc_dtls13 | timeouttest, heavy_loss_test | Unit tested |
| DTLS-52 | 9147 §5.8.1, 8446 §4.4.4 | Application data of epoch 3 or later processed only after the peer Finished; the client is connected once its Finished flight is out (data flows both ways), keeps resending it until the server's ACK and fails without one | webrtc_dtls13, webrtc_dtls13_hs | server_rejects_client_fingerprint_test, deferred_fingerprint_client_test, no_ack_no_connection_test, data_while_waiting_for_ack_test, BoGo (DTLS-Retransmit-Client-NoImplictACKFinished) | Interoperability tested |
| DTLS-53 | 9147 §4.2.1, §6.1 | Records of epoch 2 or 3 arriving before their keys are buffered (32) and processed once the keys exist; other epochs without keys are discarded | webrtc_dtls13 | records_before_server_hello_test, duplication_and_reordering_test | Unit tested |
| DTLS-54 | 9147 §8, §4.2.1, errata 8047, 8050 | KeyUpdate: on request or after rekey_records, new keys only after the ACK, update_requested acknowledged at once and answered (Figure 14), once while ours is pending, a retransmitted KeyUpdate acknowledged again, previous read epoch kept for reordering for one MSL (2 minutes) after the first record of the new one, epochs limited to 2^16-1 | webrtc_dtls13_epoch | key_update_test, many_key_updates_test, key_update_lost_ack_test, automatic_key_update_test, key_update_errors_test, key_update_request_answered_once_test, previous_epoch_expires_test, openssl13_server_key_update, openssl13_client_key_update, BoGo (KeyUpdate-*-DTLS) | Interoperability tested |
| DTLS-55 | 8446 §7.5, 5764 §4.2 | Exporter, EXTRACTOR-dtls_srtp; no context and empty context are the same | webrtc_dtls13_keys | handshake_test, interop compares key material with OpenSSL; SRTP media with Chromium (webrtc_pc_interop_SUITE) | Interoperability tested |
| DTLS-56 | 8446 §4.6.1, §4.2.9 | NewSessionTicket: with resumption => true the server issues a stateless ticket after each handshake (AES-256-GCM under a key that lives with the ticket table, holding the PSK, suite, issue time, age_add, the peer certificate and the early data limit), only to a client that offered psk_dhe_ke; the client keeps the last ticket per set of remote fingerprints, for single use | webrtc_dtls13_hs, webrtc_dtls13_server, webrtc_dtls_tickets | resumption_test, tickets_need_psk_modes_test, openssl13_server_resumption, openssl13_client_resumption | Interoperability tested |
| DTLS-57 | 9147 §5.1 | Amplification limit: until a cookie exchange or the end of the handshake validates the client's address, a server sends at most three times the bytes received from it; datagrams over the limit wait for more bytes or the validation (DTLS 1.2 without HelloVerifyRequest too); address_validated => true for an owner that validated the address otherwise | webrtc_dtls, webrtc_dtls13_server, webrtc_dtls_hs | webrtc_dtls13_tests:amplification_limit_test, amplification_limit_dtls12_test, cookie_validates_address_test | Unit tested; WebRTC transports keep the cookie exchange on |
| DTLS-58 | 9147 §5.8.3, §5.8.2, §4.4 | At most 10 records per transmission, the rest after the next ACK or timer; the timer of a new flight is 1.5 times the RTT of the last flight acknowledged without retransmission (at least 50 ms), after the handshake a backed-off value is kept until then (handshake flights start from the RTT based value: under 30% loss a carried back-off held handshakes past their deadline); from the second retransmission records and datagrams shrink to half the MTU (at least 512 bytes) | webrtc_dtls13 | webrtc_dtls13_tests:max_records_test, rtt_timer_test, smaller_records_test | Unit tested; the 400 ms initial value is kept (the DTLS-SRTP practice, RFC 9147 suggests 1 s) |
| DTLS-59 | 8446 §2.2, §2.3, §4.2.9 to §4.2.11, §8 | PSK resumption with psk_dhe_ke only (forward secrecy kept), binder checked, ticket age and lifetime checked, the ticket's certificate checked against the current SDP fingerprints (RFC 8827 §6.5 holds without certificate messages); 0-RTT with early_data => true: early data in epoch 1 within the ticket limit, accepted once per ticket (anti-replay), rejected after a HelloRetryRequest (early_data_rejected, the caller resends) | webrtc_dtls13_hs, webrtc_dtls13_server, webrtc_dtls13_keys | rfc8448_resumption_test, resumption_refused_test, early_data_test, early_data_rejected_on_retry_test, openssl13_server_early_data, openssl13_client_early_data, webrtc_pc_SUITE:dtls_resumption | Interoperability tested; off by default, browsers do not resume DTLS |
| DTLS-77 | 8446 §8 | The ticket key and the anti-replay set share one lifetime: after an application restart no earlier ticket opens, so no early data is replayed; the table holds at most 10,000 entries, a full table refuses early data rather than forget a used ticket, a new client ticket replaces the oldest | webrtc_dtls_tickets | webrtc_dtls_tickets_tests, early_data_replay_after_restart_test | Unit tested |
| DTLS-64 | 8446 §4.6.2, §4.2.6, 9147 §5.8.4 | Post-handshake authentication: a client with post_handshake_auth => true offers the extension; the server asks with request_client_auth/2 (a fresh context, one request at a time); the client answers with Certificate, CertificateVerify and Finished over the handshake transcript and the CertificateRequest, keyed by its current traffic secret; the certificate must match the remote fingerprints; {peer_authenticated, Der} on success; a request the client did not allow is unexpected_message | webrtc_dtls13_pha | webrtc_dtls13_tests:pha_test, pha_not_offered_test, pha_wrong_certificate_test, pha_lost_answer_test, openssl13_client_pha, openssl13_server_pha | Interoperability tested (OpenSSL 4.1 both roles); off by default, WebRTC authenticates in the handshake |
| DTLS-62 | 9147 §9, 9146 §3 | Connection ID: connection_id extension in ClientHello and ServerHello when both sides enable it (dtls => #{connection_id => true}), the peer's CID in our protected records (C bit, part of the additional data), records with a CID we did not offer rejected | webrtc_dtls13_record, webrtc_dtls13_hs, webrtc_dtls13_server | webrtc_dtls13_tests:connection_id_test, connection_id_refused_test, unexpected_cid_record_test, webrtc_pc_SUITE:dtls_connection_id | E2E tested; no interop peer negotiates it (OpenSSL's tools have no option for it, browsers do not offer it); off by default |
| DTLS-63 | 9147 §9, §5.8.4, 9146 §8 | After the handshake: we receive on up to 4 CIDs of the offered length, records with another CID dropped; a RequestConnectionId is answered with spare CIDs (NewConnectionId, usage spare) as many as asked for and fit; once the peer's authenticated records carry another of our CIDs the previous one is retired, still accepted for late records until a request needs its room, so rotation goes on indefinitely; the peer's spare CIDs kept (up to 8); NewConnectionId for immediate use switches the CID we send; on an ICE restart or a new selected pair our records move to a spare CID, asking for more when none is left; one CID message at a time, after the current flight is acknowledged; both refused with unexpected_message when CIDs were not negotiated | webrtc_dtls13_cid, webrtc_dtls13_hs, webrtc_transport_secure | webrtc_dtls13_tests:new_connection_id_test, request_connection_id_test, rotate_without_spares_test, unknown_cid_dropped_test, cid_message_waits_for_ack_test, many_rotations_test, retired_cid_still_accepted_test, lost_cid_messages_test, webrtc_pc_SUITE:connection_id_rotation (five ICE restarts) | E2E tested; no independent implementation to test against: OpenSSL 4.1 has no DTLS 1.3 CID API, mbedTLS 3 and Pion only DTLS 1.2 CIDs (RFC 9146, without these messages) |
| DTLS-60 | 6347 §4.2.3, 9147 §5.5 | Reassembly bounded under hostile fragmentation: held bytes never exceed the advertised length, at most 256 disjoint ranges per message (fragments that extend a range do not count), a range's data copied into one binary past 32 fragments | webrtc_dtls_reasm | overlap_flood_test, tiny_fragments_capped_test, one_byte_fragments_test, held_bytes_bounded_test | Unit tested |
| DTLS-61 | 8842 §5, 9429 §5.8.3 | Changed remote fingerprints or tls-id: refused without an ICE restart; with one, the old association is closed (SRTP keys and SCTP dropped) and a new handshake starts with the new fingerprints; our descriptions carry a=tls-id, renewed with each association | webrtc_jsep, webrtc_transport | webrtcjsep_tests:fingerprint_change*, tls_id_offered_test, webrtc_pc_SUITE:fingerprint_change_refused, fingerprint_change_ends_association | E2E tested |
| DTLS-65 | 5246 §7.2.2, 8446 §6.2 | A handshake message the state does not expect is refused with unexpected_message before its body is parsed; only an expected one that does not parse is a decode_error | webrtc_dtls_hs | BoGo (WrongMessageType) | Interoperability tested |
| DTLS-66 | 5246 §6.2.1, 8446 §5.2, §6 | An authentic record of more than 2^14 bytes of plaintext ends the connection with record_overflow; an alert of unknown level with illegal_parameter | webrtc_dtls_record, webrtc_dtls13_record, webrtc_dtls12, webrtc_dtls13 | recordlimits_test, BoGo (LargePlaintext, SendBogusAlertType) | Interoperability tested |
| DTLS-67 | 5246 §7.4.9, 8446 §4.4.4 | A Finished that is not the expected verify_data, whatever its length, ends the connection with decrypt_error | webrtc_dtls_hs, webrtc_dtls13_hs | BoGo (TrailingMessageData-ServerFinished) | Interoperability tested |
| DTLS-68 | 9147 §4 | The client's ClientHello records carry DTLS 1.0 until a version is chosen (allowed for the initial ClientHello, as DTLS 1.2 clients do), DTLS 1.2 after a HelloRetryRequest | webrtc_dtls12 | BoGo (VersionNegotiation) | Interoperability tested |
| DTLS-69 | 9147 §5.1 | A DTLS 1.3 ServerHello after a HelloVerifyRequest is refused | webrtc_dtls_hs | BoGo (DTLS13-HelloVerifyRequest) | Interoperability tested |
| DTLS-70 | 9147 §5.5 | Flights are packed: fragments of consecutive messages of one epoch share a record, and a record takes what is left of the datagram before a new one starts | webrtc_dtls13 | BoGo (PackHandshake, SplitHandshakeRecords) | Interoperability tested |
| DTLS-71 | 9147 §6.1 | Alerts: a DTLS 1.3 server that sent its Finished alerts in epoch 3; otherwise the epoch the peer last saw from us | webrtc_dtls | BoGo (TrailingMessageData-TLS13-ClientCertificate, DTLS13-SendExtraFinished-Packed) | Interoperability tested |
| DTLS-72 | 8446 §4.2.4 | certificate_authorities is a non-empty list of non-empty names | webrtc_dtls13_msg | certificate_authorities_syntax_test, BoGo (RejectEmptyCertificateAuthorities) | Interoperability tested |
| DTLS-73 | 5246 §7.4.1.2 | A DTLS 1.2 client offers every suite whatever its own key type (the suite names the server's key) | webrtc_dtls | mixedkey_types_test | Unit tested |
| DTLS-74 | 5246 §7.4.8 | A DTLS 1.2 server reads the next epoch only after the client's CertificateVerify is verified; a ChangeCipherSpec that overtakes it is held until then | webrtc_dtls12 | webrtc_dtls12_ccs_tests, DTLS-Fuzzer (interop/dtlsfuzzer) | Unit tested |
| DTLS-75 | 8446 §5.1 | Handshake messages do not span a key change: data buffered after the server's Finished or a KeyUpdate in the same epoch, or a new message in an epoch already left, ends the connection with unexpected_message (sent before our keys change) | webrtc_dtls13_hs, webrtc_dtls13_epoch, webrtc_dtls13 | extrafinished_test, message_after_key_update_test, BoGo (DTLS13-SendExtraFinished, KeyUpdate-ExtraMessage) | Interoperability tested |
| DTLS-76 | 6347 §4.2.3, 9147 §5.5 | Messages buffered at most six ahead of the next expected one (the longest flight); further ones are dropped | webrtc_dtls_reasm | window_test, BoGo (DTLS-FragmentWindow) | Interoperability tested |